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(Commission communication of 14 October  1981  to the Council. and Parliament) Introduction 
1. ,  During  Parliament's  debate  on  the  Pro-
gramme Address in  February 1981  the Commis-
sion undertook to produce a comprehensive paper 
on interinstitutional  relations.  However, the pa-
per  must be  read  in  the  broader context of the 
further political and institutional development of 
the Community. 
There are three reasons for  this. 
The first is  implementation of the May mandate. 
In the report which the Commission produced at 
the end of June 1981 1 we put forward an overall 
strategy to  preserve the common  market,  adapt 
and  amplify  existing  policies  and  develop  new 
ones.  Further  development  of European  policy 
· calls  not only  for  a political  willingness  on  the 
part of the  Member  States  to  embark  on  new 
policies, but also for institutions capable of taking 
the necessary decisions.  It is  essentiaL  therefore, 
that  the  Community  be  given  the  institutional 
machinery it needs. The Commission regards this 
paper as a logical addition to its report on the May 
mandate. 
Secondly,  the Commission  feels  that this  paper 
echoes the institutional debate held in  Parliament 
in  July  1981.2  That debate was  not confined to 
institutional relations as they now stand. Speakers 
went beyond these to consider how the Commu-
nity  should  develop  institutionally  in  the years 
ahead, with an eye in particular to the European 
elections due in  1984. The Commission wants to 
be invqlved in this debate. It believes that the time 
is  ripe  for  it  to  present  its  view  of possible 
developments  outside  the  framework  of  the 
present Treaties. 
Thirdly and lastly, the Commission welcomes the 
reopening  of the  political  debate  on  European 
·Union. Ten years have gone by since the idea was 
launched at the first Paris Summit, making it  all 
the  more  urgent  to  encourage  new  initiatives 
now.  The  Commission  has  every  intention  of 
playing  its  part  and  making  a  constructive 
contribution to the discussion. 
For these  various  reasons  the  Commission  has 
expanded this  paper  beyond  what  it  promised 
Parliament in  February 1981. 
2.  The  continued  development  of  common 
policies  - the  main  objective  of the  mandate 
report  - will  be  a  dead  letter  unless  the 
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Community's  institutions  can  rediscover  their 
powers of decision. The Commission has no wish 
to  rehash  all  the  reports  which  have  been 
produced  on  the  Community's  decision-maki~g 
mechanism, to vanish without trace.  We would 
·simply make the point that the mechanism must 
recover  its  true  Community  form  and  work 
effectively  again.  Even  now.  with  the  present 
decision-making  process, the Community is  un-
able to deal  with the problems facing it,, a state of 
affairs  which  will  grow  only  worse  when  the 
Community  is  enlarged  to  include  two · new 
Member  States.  Yet  the  institutions'  credibility 
will  always  depend  on their  effectiveness  ..  It is 
therefore  of  paramount  importance  for  the 
Community to  restore  the  institutional  balance 
that the authors of the Treaties had in  mind. This 
'means  that the  Council  must  increase  its  effi-
ciency by resorting, if need be, to majority voting. 
The  second  part of the paper  goes  into  this  in 
more detail.  · 
3.  The  Commission  believes  that,  if the Com-
munity is to develop, Parliament must be given a 
bigger role to play.  Indeed, any strengthening of 
Parliament's  position  widens  the  Community:s 
democratic  base.  As  the  Community's  only 
directly elected institution, Parliament constitutes 
a  unique  public  rostrum  for  the  citizens  of 
Europe.  · 
If  we are to revitalize European policy, it must be 
given more citizen-appeal. Parliament could serve 
as a platform for this, but to do so it must become 
the  scene  of major  political  events.  Parliament 
itself must have a  hand  in  political  events~ The 
third part of the paper considers ways and means 
of  strengthening  Parliament's  role  within  the 
framework of the present Treaties. 
The Commission has no wish to interfere in any 
way with Parliament's role and responsibilities ; 
its  suggestions  merely  point to  ways  in  which 
Parliament could extend  its  influence rapidly to 
an  area  where  it  is  noticeably  absent,  namely 
legislation. The last part of the paper looks at the 
role Parliament might play at a later stage of the 
Community's institutional development. 
4.  European  integration  is  initially  a  wholly 
political concept, whose implementation proceeds 
1  Supplement I I 81  - Bull. EC. 
2  OJ  C  234,  14.9.1981; Bull.  EC 7/8-1981, points  2.3.4  to 
2.3.9. 
s. 3/82 by  the  formulation  of  economic  policies  and 
decisions.  Accordingly. if new  policies  are to  be 
launched and successfully implemented: a broad-
ening of the political consensus which underpins 
the Community is more important than ever. Our 
25-year  experiment has forced  us  to  admit that 
the  pursuit  of the  objectives  laid  down  in  the 
Treaties  will  not.  by  itself.  lead  to  genuine 
European integration.  The Community  must go 
further  and  the  Commission  welcomes  recent 
moves to strengthen political cooperation and full 
Commission participation therein. It regards this 
as a precondition for progress. especially progress 
towards  European  Union.  The last  part of the 
paper  also  discusses  this  aspect  of  European 
cooperation. 
5.  At all  events  the Commission  would stress 
that  care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  closer 
political  cooperation  does  not  reinforce  the 
intergovernmental  nature  of the  Community's 
decision-making mechanism. That would weaken 
rather  than  strengthen  the  Community.  Econ-
omic integration calls  for  a different mechanism 
to political cooperation. 
Any  new  internal  development  presupposes 
stronger institutions. But this would not preclude 
the further development of  European cooperation 
in  fields  where  it  has  always  been  purely 
intergovernmental.  As  soon  as  convergence  of 
political ideas is achieved, Member States should 
find  it  easier  to  bow  to  a  truly  Community 
decision-making mechanism. 
The  institutions'  powers  of  decision  must  be 
increased  as  the  Community grows  in  political 
maturity. It would be as well to bear this in mind 
as  we embark on  our political  and  institutional 
debate. 
Development of Community policy,  strengthen-
ing  of the  institutions  and  broadening  of the 
political consensus underpinning cooperation are 
the. three prongs of future action. As guardian of 
the Treaties, the Commission, fully  aware of the 
original responsibilities  it shoulders in  the Com-
. munity's  institutional  set-up,  intends  to  be  and 
stay in  the foreground of the debate. 
This paper,  which constitutes the Commission's 
contribution to  Parliament's discussion,  sets  out 
. the guidelines on which the Commission propo-
ses  to  base  its  consultations  with  the  other 
institutions. 
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The interinstitutional balance 
6.  There is no doubt that the decline in Member 
States'  political  commitment  has  strengthened 
intergovernmental  factors  within  the  Commu-
nity.  A  prime  example  of this  is  the  decision-
making process within the Council. Reference has 
been  made  on  a  number  of occasions - in the 
Vedel  Report1  for  instance - to  the  unhealthy 
consequences of the· 'Luxembourg  compromise' 
for  dec~sion-making.  Its  influence  has  been 
threefold : it is resorted to by all Member States, it 
is  used on virtually all  issues and it is invoked at 
all  levels  of decision-making.  The  Three  Wise  . 
Men'  in  their  report2  suggested,  quite  logicaliy, 
that  in  cases  where the Treaty  did  not  call  for 
unanimity  and  where  no  Member. State's  v'ital 
interests  were at  stake,  a  vote  should  be  taken 
after a certain amount of time had been devoted 
to the search for  a generally acceptable solution. 
Any Member State which wanted to avert a vote 
because of an  important national  interest  ~ould 
have  to  say  so  clearly  and  explicitly  and  take 
responsibility for  the consequences on  behalf of 
its  Government.  The  Commission  had  already 
suggested a similar approach in  the section of its 
communication  on  enlargement  (the  'Fresco  ')3 
dealing  with  the  transitional  period  and  the 
institutional consequences. 
7.  The  Commission  would  like  to  make  two 
further comments. Firstly, it would like to clarify 
the intrinsic  nature of majority voting.  Majority 
voting does not mean. that a vote is taken in every 
case  where  majority  voting is possible,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  it  is  always  preferable  for 
Council decisions to be acceptable to all Council 
members.  However, even if unanimity is  out of 
the  question,  it  should  be  possible  to  avoid 
deadlock.  Majority decisions should therefore be 
seen  as  a  last  resort,  but one  which cannot be 
abandoned  without  seriously  jeopardj.zing  the 
workings of the Community. 
Secondly,  routine  insistence  on  unanimity  has 
eroded the Commission's status in relation to the 
first paragraph of Article 149 of the EEC Treaty, 
in  that it  has  made  it  easier  for the Council  to 
depart from  its  proposals : the most it can do  is 
withdraw its proposal. The practice has also upset 
1  Supplement 4/72- Bull.  EC. 
2  Bull.  EC 11-1979. points  1.5.1  and  1.5.2. 
3  Supplement 2/78- Bull.  EC. 
7 arrangements for  parliamentary responsibility as 
envisaged by the Treaty. 
8.  Another spin-off from  the  strengthening  of 
intergovernmental factors within the Community 
is  the  Council's  refusal  to  delegate  important 
administrative and managerial functions uncondi-
tionally  to  the  Commission,  even  when  the 
Treaties explicitly state that the Commission is to 
perform such  functions,  as,  for  example,  under 
Article 205  of the EEC Treaty with reference to 
the budget. 
The  fourth  indent  of Article  .155  of the  EEC 
Tr:eaty  specifies  that  the  Commission  'exercises 
the powers conferred on it by the Council for the 
implementation  of the  rules  laid  down· by  the 
latter',  confirming  that  the  Commission  is  the 
Community's  supreme  executive  body.  At  the 
Paris  Summit in  December  1974,  the  Heads  of 
State or Government agreed 'on the advantage of 
making  use  of the  provisions  of the  Treaty  of 
Rome  whereby  the  powers  of implementation 
and management arising out of Community rules 
may  be  conferred  on  the  Commission·.  The 
Council.  however,  has  consistently acted  other-
wise.  The Three Wise Men' in their report and 
the.  Commission  in  its  communication  on  the 
problems posed by enlargement ('Fresco') made a 
number of useful  suggestions  for  lightening the 
Council's perpetual burden  and restoring one of 
·its key functions to  the Commission. 
9.  · The developments discussed  above have led 
to .a  shift . in  the  balance  of powers  from  the 
Commission to the Council. An early as  1972 the 
Vedel Report pointed out that this shift had led to 
Council predominance growing 'to such a point 
that the Council,  acting  in  some 'instances  as  a 
Community body and in some others as the States 
·in concert. has become the sole effective centre of 
power in the system'. The Commission's political 
function  has  been  heavily  compromised,  as 
regards  both  its  involvement  in  the  legislative 
process and its  executive and management func-
tions.  The  Council  must,  of course,  play  the 
leading role in decision-making. But the Commis-
sion  cannot  be  excluded  from  this  'political' 
function. The Commission for  its  part is anxious 
to preserve itS political function, by both its power 
to propose and its  power to mediate. 
I 0.  The  Commission  is  absolutely  convinced 
that the first  step  towards strengthening Parlia-
ment's position must be the restoration of mutual 
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trust  between  Member  States  and  a  return  to · 
observance of the letter and spirit of the Treaties. 
Restoration of mutual trust would automati<;ally. 
mean that the Community's political institutions 
were once  again  in  a  position  to  exercise  their 
integrating function.  In  the case of the Council, 
the  view  expressed .  by  the  Heads  of State  or 
Government,  namely  that  'it  is  necessary  to 
renounce the practice which consists of making 
agreement  on  all  questions  conditional  ori  the 
unanimous consent of the Member States' (point 
6 of  the final communique of  their Paris meeting, 
9  and  I 0  December  1974),  must  be  put  into 
practice. Only in this way will the Commission be 
able  to  play  its  rightful  role  in  the  legislative 
process. But it must also be allowed to exercise its 
management powers to the full.  If this  is  done. 
Parliament  will  win  back  the  responsibilities 
conferred on it by the Treaties, namely to keep a 
watch on  the Commission and provide a demo-
cratic base  for  the Community's legislative  pro-
cess. 
11.  The  Commission  is  aware  that  there .are 
other shortcomings· in  the  workings  of all  the ·  · 
institutions- the Commission itself included. It is 
not going into them in detail, but simply referring 
back to the various reports mentioned above and · 
to  the  many institutional  resolutions· passed  by 
Parliament.  · 
In this paper the Commission's only intention is 
to highlight the two most essential aspects for all 
interinstitutional relations. As soon as substantial 
improvements  are  made  there,  solutions  to  the 
other probie.ms could be found more easily. 
12.  The  European  Council  would  then  no 
longer have to take the decisions that the various 
Councils  had  failed  to  take  and  could  fully 
concentrate  on  its  prime  role  as  the  political 
dynamo - the rQie sketched out for it ·at the Paris 
Summit in December  1974. 
Parliament's role in  the decision-
making process 
13.  The  Commission  has  stressed. the  impor-
tance  of Parliament's  role  in  the  Community's 
decision-making process on numerous occasions. 
Clearly, Parliament's full  potential as a democra-
tic power can only be realized in a climate of  open 
cooperation between the three institutions. 
s. 3/82 If  it is to be truly productive. three-way coopera-
tion - and cooperation between Commission and 
Parliament in particular - must not be allowed to 
interfere with the responsibilities assigned specifi-
cally  to  the  Commission  by  ·the  Treaties.  The 
Commission's right to initiate Community legisla-
tion is one of the original and cardinal features of 
the Community structure. The Commission  rec-
ognizes and supports Parliament's aspirations, but 
it  is  also  anxious  to  discharge  the  function 
assigned it by the Treaties to the best of its ability. 
It  ~oes  without  saying  that  it  is  politically 
accountable to Parliament for the way in which it 
performs this task. 
While·  it  is  accordingly  keen  that  Parliament 
should  engage  in  moves  of its  own,  and  fully 
intends to. give  these every possible support (see 
· point  18)~ the Commission feels  it must also state 
forthrightly  that  parliamentary  participation  in 
the  actual  decision-making  process  cannot  be 
other.than at the expense of the Council's quasi-
monopoly  of this.  Parliament's  very  right  and 
proper  aspirations  should  initially  materialize 
through, in  particular, extension of the concilia-
tion procedure (see point 19). 
This said, the Commission is determined to do all 
it  can  to facilitate  interinstitutional  cooperation, 
making  full  use  of  existing  procedures  and 
proposing ways of strengthening them, so  as  to 
create  a  genuine  political  platform to  serve  the 
Community. 
On this point the Commission is really taking up 
Parliament's debate  on institutional  relations  of 
July 1981. Many of the ideas on the functions of 
Parliament discussed below are, in fact,  simply a 
rewording of suggestions it has  made earlier. 
I 4.  For the Community's decision-making ma-
chinery to  operate efficiently,  each  of the  three 
institutions  involved  must  be  in  good  running 
order. The Commission would like to stress here 
that  it  could  only  play  a  greater  part  in 
Parliament's political  debates if certain improve-
ments were made in the way in which parliamen-
tary proceedings are organized. 
15.  It  is  not  for  the  Commission  to  tell 
Parliament  how  to  perform  its  watchdog  role. 
Parliament has the means and knows how to use 
them. The Commission for its part recognizes this 
role and is  prepared to ensure that Parliament is 
able to perform it  fully. 
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The  Commission  feels  that  it  is  essential  that 
Parliament should vet action taken on its amend-
ments,  resolutions  and  so  forth.  Parliament's 
committees provide an  ideal  forum  for  this,  and 
the  Commission  hopes  that  the  agreements 
reached  in  'this  matter  can  be  extended.  The 
present procedure for informing the full House of 
follow-ups  to  Parliament's  opinions  must  be 
improved  too ..  Similarly,  better  preparation  for 
debates,  either  ih  writing  or  at committee level, 
could well give them more political bite. 
16.  Against this background,  it is  hardly sur-
prising  that  Parliament's  main  interest  in  the 
institutional debate is  to put its case for a say in 
legislative matters.  As  things  now stand, Parlia-
ment's powers in  this area are very limited. It is 
therefore perfectly understandable that it is trying 
to expand and exploit its consultative function. 
The Commission feels that, on the whole, existing 
procedures provide Parliament with ·the means of 
acquiring  a  fair  measure of influence,  provided 
that they are consistently and rigorously applied 
in a spirit of mutual cooperation. 
This is why the Commission understands the real 
significance of the recent changes to  Parliament's 
rules  of procedure.  It is  aware that  they  make 
provision· for  conciliation between the Commis-
sion  and Parliament and is  ready to  act accord-
ingly  without,  moreover,  jeopardizing  its  own 
institutional responsibilities or needlessly blocking 
the decisions which are  needed  for  the develop-
ment of the Community. 
17.  As things now stand, Parliament's involve-
ment in  the decision-making process begins, as a 
general  rule,  when  procedures  are  fairly  well 
advanced. The Commission feels that it would be 
useful  to  know  where  Parliament  stands  at  a 
much earlier stage. 
It therefore·  intends  to  consult  the  House  and 
Committees  in  advance  more  frequently  on 
important issues,  such as  decisions  affecting  the 
.  ·future of the Community, before it makes formal 
proposals.  In  the case  of major on-going  initia-
tives with political implications, the Cominission 
normally  sends  Parliament  and  the  Council 
communications  setting  out  the  main  issues 
involved. It intends to step up this practice and tci 
draw on the views expressed by Parliament in the 
ensuing  preliminary  political  debate  when  the 
time comes to shape its proposals. 
9 18.  The  Commission  considers  it  quite  legiti-
. mate for  a directly elected  Parliament to  discuss 
initiatives to develop  the Community and  press 
for  implementation  of  its  findings.  After  the 
debates  in  the  House  the  Commission  takes  a 
carefullook at the suggestions but by Parliament 
with a  view to  seeing if and  how it can act on 
·them. 
It attaches  the  utmost  importance  to  the  ideas 
adopted  by  Parliam~nt  and  incorporated  into 
formal  proposals  and  is  more  than  willing  to 
draw  on  them · provided  that  there  are  no 
objections ofsubstance. If there are, it  will  give 
Parliament a detailed  and  timely explanation of 
the reasons for  its reservations. 
19.  In the  Commission's view the conciliation 
procedure. introduced on its initiative and enshri-
ned  in  the Joint Declaration  of 4 March  1975.1 
was designed to give Parliament an opportunity, 
in specific cases, to add weight to its opinions and 
play  an  effective  role  in  the  decision-making 
process  by  means  of direct  dialogue  with  the 
Council. Had things gone as planned, the concilia-
tion  procedure  might ·have  been  a  first  step 
towards  genuine  powers  of  co-decision  for 
Parliament. 
It must be admitted, however, that the procedure 
failed  to  satisfy  Parliament  for  a  variety  of 
reasons. Parliament never felt that it was involved 
in  real dialogue with Council members, although 
this was the raison d'etre of the declaration in the 
· Commission's view. 
.  The  Commission  therefore  proposes  that  the 
other parties to the declaration should review the 
procedure  with  a  view  to  making  it  really 
effective.2 
Conciliation  should take place  at  an  early stage 
before  national  positions  have  become  entren-
ched, and all Council members should be free to. 
participate, as originally intended. Better prepara-
tion in the form of preliminary contacts between 
institutions (which the  Commission  would acti-
vely  assist) could increase the chances of agree-
ment being reached. 
If the conciliation procedure is to produce results. 
three-way discussions must be initiated in  which 
the  Commission  would  do  all  in  its  power  to 
promote political entente between the institutions. 
The Commission for  its part advocates extension 
of the conciliation procedure and intends to raise 
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this  in  connection  with  review  of  the  Joint 
Declaration. It feels.  however, that there is  little 
point in extending the procedure until the content 
is  brought into line with the objective. 
20.  Legislative conciliation covers a very broad 
field already, namely 'Community acts of general 
application  which  have  appreciable  financial 
implications.  and of which the  adoption  is  not 
required  by  virtue  of acts  already  in  existence·. 
Very often. decisions to implement new policies 
or develop existing ones have s:ubstantial budget-
ary and financial repercussions. There is therefore 
no apparent reason  why the legislative concilia-
tion procedure could not be used extensively. For 
instance, the Commission considers that most of 
the  decisions  following  on  from  the  mandate 
report would qualify, the object being to ell sure 
that they are consistent  with any action  which 
Parliament  takes  later  under  its  budgetary  po-
wers,  when· the  financial  consequences  of· the 
mandate are incorporated into the budget. 
It should be borne in  mind that so far legislative 
conciliation has run up against a series of general 
problems in  which Parliament's budgetary pow-
. ers have been at stake. They include the class.ifica-
tion  of  expenditure  as  compulsory  or  non-
compulsory3  (which  determines  the  respective 
powers  of the  institutions  with  regard  to. the 
budget), the indication of figures,  whether bind-
ing or for  purposes of evaluation, to  restrict the 
budgetary implications of  the action proposed, the 
question whether or not the budget by itself is an 
adequate legal' basis for expenditure and the part 
to  be  played · by  the  committees  in  taking 
individual financing decisions. 
It  is therefore essential-and this would also serve 
to  revitalize  legislative  conciliation  - that  the 
interinstitutional  dialogue  on  budgetary  matters 
should  produce  a  genuine  convergence  of the 
views of the institutions. 
21.  It is  in  the budgetary field  above all  others 
that Parliament possesses  real  powers, although 
recent years have shown that using them can lead 
to confrontations between  the two arms  of the 
budgetary ·authority,  both  when  the  budget  is 
I  OJ c 89, 22.4.1975. 
2  See p.  16 et  .~eq. of this Supplement: 
3  'Compulsory' expenditure is  'expenditure necessarily  resul-
ting  from  [the]  Treaty,, or  from  acts  adopted  in  accordance 
therewith' (Art.  203  EEC). 
s.  3/82 b~irig established and when it  is being implemen-
.ted.  On  a  number of occasions the Commission 
has called for a real interinstitutional dialogue and 
Parliament  has  fought  for  this  for  a  number of 
years.  Although  some  initial  progress  has  been 
made. now is the time for it to begin in earnest. It 
is true that agreement has been reached on some 
budgetary principles. but Parliament has expres-
sed the desire to go  further  along this  road and 
deal with all the points listed in its resolution of 1  0 
April  1981 1 as  well  as  any other matters which 
. the Council might wish to raise. The Commisson 
fully supports this approach by Parliament. 
On these points, as on others where the positions 
of the institutions are still far apart, the interinsti-
tutional dialogue must lead to solutions which are 
acceptable  to  all  the  parties  concerned  and  in 
conformity with the Treaties. 
With respect to the content of the budget, where 
Parliament's most extensive powers concern non-
compulsory  expenditure.  the  Commission,  to-
gether with Parliament.  will  continue to  seek  a 
better  balance  between  compulsory  and  non-
compulsory  expenditure.  Tangible  evidence  of 
· this  determination  could  be  seen  in  recent 
budgets,  but  more  will  be  possible  in  the 
restructuring  exercise  under  the  mandate.  The 
Commission's objective approach to the classifica-
tion of expenditure is  not hr removed from that 
of Parliament. 
2  2.  The Treaty of 22 July 197 5 gives Parliament 
the power to grant the Commission a discharge in 
respect of the implementation of the Community 
budget.  Parliament  has  interpreted  this  right 
extensively  and  has  made  political  use  of its 
·power of control by examining both the utiliza- ·, 
tion of appropriations and the implementation of 
the various policies. The Commission can confirm 
that it accepts this form of parliamentary control. 
23.  The Commission is  aware that the conclu-
sion of international agreements is a Community 
activity of major political importance and under-
stands Parliament's growing, legitimate interest.2 
It is  also  aware  that  Parliament  considers  its  · 
powers  in  this  respect  Jess  than  satisfactory  -
when  compared  with  those  of some  national 
· parliaments - despite the fact that the Luns and 
Westerterp  procedures,  which  have  not  always 
been exploited to  the full.  represent an improve-
ment  on  the  legal  situation  deriving ·from  the 
Treaties. 
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The Commission  is  prepared to collaborate with 
Parliament and the Council in  the search  for  an 
agreement on practical improvements to existing 
procedures so that Parliament can be more closely 
involved  in  the  preparation  of  international 
agreements. without eroding the competences of 
the individual institutions. 
In  practice the Luns and .Westerterp procedures 
apply  to  association  agreements  and  bilateral 
trade agreements only. The Commission feels that 
they could readily be extended to other Commu-
nity  agreements.  in  other  words, to  ~ultilateral 
trade agreements (such as comlnodity agreements 
on cereals, sugar. cocoa, etc.) and agreements in 
other fields  (such as  the environment). This  has 
indeed already been done, as witness for instance 
Parliament's action  in  holding  a  debate  on  the 
Multifibre Arrangement. 
Moreover, the content of the procedures could be· 
improved  to  provide  Parliament  with  more 
information,  thereby  strengthening  its  advisory 
and supervisory roles. 
There  is  nothing  to  prevent  Parliament  from 
organizing  a  policy  debate  in  plenary  session 
before. major  negotiations  begin.  If Parliament 
were to do so, the Commission would be only too · 
pleased to take part. 
As far as negotiating mandates are concerned, it is 
hard to see  how the  matter could be  debated  in 
public without jeopardizing Community interests. 
However,  the  Commission  has  no  objection  to 
briefing the appropriate parliamentary committee 
on the general political and economic factors on 
which the negotiating mandate is  based. 
The Commission is already in the habit of briefing 
parliamentary ·committees  on  the  progress  of 
negotiations.  It is  quite prepared to do  more in 
this  respect  on  the  understanding  that contacts 
remain· unofficial and confidential. 
Taken together,  these improvements should en-
able Parliament to achieve the  desired objective. 
namely to play a larger part in  negotiations with 
non~member countries. 
24. ·  FinaUy,  the  Commission  considers  that, 
even in the short term. Parliament has the means 
to extend its  influence. 
I  OJ  C  JQ\, 4.5.J98J. 
2  See  p.  20 et seq.·· of this Supplement 
11 1he Commission  feels  that  the  proposals  and 
suggestions  made  in  this  section  of the  paper 
could  make  for  better  and. more  balanced  rela-
·tions between Parliament arid the Commission. It 
is  aware that  relations  between  Parliament and 
the  Council  have  also  tended  increasingly  to-
wards a direct and sometimes profitable dialogue 
and considers that such relations help to enhance 
Parliament's political standing in the Community. 
It  is  pleased  to  note  in  this  respect  that  the 
President of the European Council  has  announ-
ced that she will address the House on the work 
of the· European Council. 
Some  of  the  suggestions  regarding  relations 
between  the  three  institutions  made  in  this 
document  will  have  to  be  given  shape  in 
interinstitutional  agreements.  The  Commission 
will take the necessary steps in this regard. 
Beyond the Treaties 
2  5.  Our  suggestions  for  strengthening  Parlia-
ment's  position,  although  significant,  must  be 
seen  in  the  current context of the Community. 
With European Union in prospect,  Parliament's 
powers· should  perhaps  be  extended  further. 
European Union is,  after all,  a dynamic process 
and,  as  the 'Three Wise  Men' so  rightly said,  it 
must lead  to  a  Community prepared to  display 
increasing solidarity. The basis for this could be a 
new treaty, which would respect the fundamental 
principles of the existing Treaties and supplement 
them to establish a European Union. 
26.  The idea of a Treaty on  European Union is 
not new, since it was launched some years ago by 
Mr Tindemans in his report on European Union.' 
It was taken up by Mr Genscher in January 1981. 
And the German and Itaiian Governments have 
proposed to their partners the adoption by solemn 
declaration  of a  'European  Act'  covering  the 
European Community, political cooperation and 
the European Council.2 In other words, it would 
confirm  the  role  of  the  Community  as  the 
cornerstone of European integration and the role 
· of the  European  Council  as  the  political  body 
responsible for  laying down guidelines for  Euro-
pean cooperation. An Act along these lines would 
not create European Union but would provide a 
framework for  achieving it. 
The  Commission  considers  that  this  suggestion 
merits reflection. As the dividing line between the 
l2 
Community  and  political  cooperation  becomes 
increasingly blurred, the time is  ripe  for  putting 
forward concrete ideas.  The major issues  facing 
the  Community  (the  economic  crisis,  energy 
problems and relations with developing countries) 
can  no  longer  be  solved  without  reference  to . 
foreign  policy  decisions.  The  Commission  be-
lieves that the subject should be pursued further. 
It intends  to  make  an  active  contribution  by 
submitting its own suggestions to Parliament and 
the Member States in the near future. 
2  7.  Parliament's  views  on  this  cannot  be  ig-
nored. It endorsed the idea of  a new treaty in July 
1981 3  and  would  like  to  draft  it  itself.  The 
Commission  feels  that  any  new  treaty  should 
define the direction in which Parliament's powers 
should  be  extended,  providing  in  particular  for 
Parliament to be given certain legislative powers 
in line with the undertaking given at the first Paris 
Summit  in  1972.  It considers  it  quite  natural 
therefore that Parliament should be  involved in 
drafting  the  text  and  welcomes  Parliament's 
decision  to  set  up  a  standing  committee  on 
institutional affairs. 
The Commission is  well  aware that these ideas, 
including  the  suggestion  for  Parliament  to  be 
given a say in the appointment and investiture of 
the  Commission,  cannot  be  put  into  pnictice 
overnight, that it  will  take  time and, above  all, 
political will. 
28.  European  Union  is  not  a  matter  for  the 
Member  States'  governments  alone.  Its  success 
depends  in  large  measure on the. support of the 
people of  Europe. In the Declaration on European 
Identity issued on 15 December 197 3,4 the Heads 
of  State  or  Government  recognized  that  the 
European  identity  is  one  of the  ·fundamental 
in.gredients for a united Europe. 
The Commission feels sure that Parliament, as the 
voice  of the spirit  of Europe,  will. do  all  in  its 
power  to  help  create  a  comprehensive  and 
effective  institutional  structure for  the Commu-
nity. 
1  Supplement I /76- Bull.  EC. 
2  Bull.  EC  11-1981. points 3.4.1  and 3.4.2. 
3  Bull.  EC 7/8-1981, point 2.i5. 
4  Seventh General Report, Annex 2 to Chapter II. 
s. 3/82 ,•· 
The  conciliation procedure 
(Commission communication of 16  December 1981  to the Council and Parliament) 
-··  \ )-Introduction 
29.  By their joint declaration of 4 March 1975 1 
the  European  Parliament.  the  Council  and  the 
Commission established a procedure for concilia-
tion  between  the  three  institutions  aimed  at 
involving  Parliament  more  effectively  in  the 
adoption of 'Community acts of general applica-
tion  which  have  appreciable  financial  implica-
tions. and of which the adoption is  not required 
by vir~ue of acts already in existence'. 
Although the procedure  has  sometimes  made it 
possible.  to  bring  the  Parliament's  and  the 
Council's positions closer together. it is generally 
agreed  that  in  most  cases  it  has  not  operated 
satisfactorily.  In  their  report  on  the  European 
institutions in October 1979 the 'Three Wise Men' 
analysed  admirably  the  procedure's  drawbacks 
and made a number of suggestions for improving 
it. 2 
At the meeting  in  Strasbourg on  17  November 
1981  between  Foreign  Ministers,  the  enlarged 
Bureau of Parliament and the Commission,3 the 
then President of the Council had the following to 
say  about  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
procedure : 'It can prove difficult to reconcile the 
two institutions· conflicting positions ; the proce-
dure is quite lengthy and the steps involved have 
not been defined in detail'. 
More generally, the procedure has not come up to 
parliamentary  expectations,  in  that  it  'has  not 
given it the feeling that it is taking part in  a real 
dialogue with the members ofthe Council, which, 
in the eyes of the Commission, was what it was 
set up for'. 
Lastly, the directly elected Parliament has called 
for  an  extension  of the  procedure  to  cover  all 
important Community acts,  whether they  have 
major  financial  implications  or  not,  and  has 
criticized the present arrangements under which, 
in practice, the procedure is initiated only if both 
the two parties agree that it is applicable. 
30.  This  is  why  in  its  communication  of 14 
October  1981  the  Commission  proposed  to  the 
European Parliament and the Council that they 
'should  review  the  procedure  with  a  view  to 
making it really effective'.4 The draft second joint 
declaration,  attached,  has  been  drawn  up  with 
this end in  view. 
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It aims.  firstly.  at  extending  the  procedure  to 
cover all  important Community acts.  as  desired  · 
by Parliament. 
Secondly.  it  provides  for  the  procedure  to  be 
initiated  at the  request  of any one of the  three 
institutions. 
It describes the normal, two-stage, procedure, to 
which exceptions can be made in special cases by 
the  Presidents  of the  three  institutions,  and ·to 
which they can add special provisions. 
It  is  intended  that  the  first  meeting  of  the 
Conciliation Committee should be held after work 
has progressed as  far  as  possible,  as soon as  the 
members of the Council have studied a Commis~ 
sion proposal sufficiently to be able to discuss it to 
some purpose with parliamentary and Commis- · 
sion representatives.  Even at the second and last 
meeting of the Conciliation Committee (if such a 
meeting js needed), the joint approach established 
by the Council should leave room for a number of 
options and thus enable discussion  to  be  profit-
able and fruitful. 
After  the  last.  meeting  Parliament  will  have  a 
certain time· in  which to deliver a new opinion, 
after which the Council  will  be entitled to take 
definitive action. 
The Commission  considers  that these  improve-
ments should enable the Parliament's institutional · 
role to  be strengthened, without this making the 
process  of  Community  decision-taking  more 
cumbersome. 
31.  As stated by  th~ President of thr;::  Commis-
sion  and the  Member of the  Commission  with 
responsibility  for  relations  with  the  European 
Parliament  at  the  meeting  in  Strasbourg ·on  17 
November,  the Commission  feels  that a  special 
procedure should be used for considering its draft 
new joint declaration. The three institutions could 
agree  to  designate  high-level  representatives  to 
consider  the Commission  draft, .  to  try to reach . 
agreement  on  proposed  amendments  and  to · 
report back  to  them.  Naturally,  the creation  of 
this ad hoc  working party holds no  implic~tions 
for  future  decisions,  each  institution  remaining 
I  OJ  C 89, 22.4.)975. 
2  Bull.  EC 11-1979. points 1.5.1  and 1.5.2. 
3  Bull.  EC  11-1981. point 2.3.1. 
4  See pp.  I 0 and II of this Supplement. 
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working party's report. 
The  Commission  thinks  that  this  suggested 
procedure  should  permit satisfactory  agreement 
to be reached rapidly on the improvements that. 
in the view of three institutions. need to be made 
to the conciliation procedure. 
Draft second joint declaration of the 
European  Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on  the 
conciliation procedure 
Tire. European  Parliament,  the  Council  and the 
Con'm1ission, 
Whereas  by  their joint declaration  of 4  March 
197 5 1  the  three  institutions  established  a  con-
ciliation procedure to  ensure that the European 
Parliament was effectively involved in the prepa-
ration  and  adoption  of decisions  giving  rise  to 
major expenditure out of or revenue accruing to 
the budget of the European Communities ; 
Whereas following the direct election of  Members 
of the European  Parliament the  part  played  by 
that  institution  in  the  Community's  legislative 
process  should  be  heightened;  whereas  to  this 
end the conciliation procedure should be extended 
to cover further  important decisions  other than 
those for  which it was originally intended ; 
Whereas  ·advantage  should  be  taken  of  past 
experience  to  improve  the  way  in  which  the 
procedure operates, 
Have agreed as follows : 
1.  The conciliation  procedure shall  be  used  for 
Community legislative acts which are of general 
.  application  and  of considerable  importance  for 
the  Community  and  whose  adoption  is  not 
required by acts already existing. 
2.  The procedure shall be initiated at the request 
of the European Parliament, the Council  or the 
Commission. 
3.  The purpose of the procedure shall be to seek 
agreement between the European Parliament and 
the Council. 
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4.  Conciliation shall be effected within a Concili- ·. 
atlon Committee composed of. representatives of 
the  European  Parliament.  the  Council  and·  the 
Commission. 
5.  Unless the Presidents of the three institutions 
concerned  decide  otherwise.  laying  down  sche-
dules  and  special  arrangements  for  the  concili-
ation  procedure  in  particular cases.  the concili-
ation proce9ure shall be as  foliows : 
(a)  a first meeting of the Conciliation Committee 
may be held as soon as. after receiving an opinion 
from  the European  Parliament. the Council  has 
determined what the main problems posed by ·a 
Commission proposal are and how they might be 
settled ; 
(b)  on  the basis of the work of the Conciliation 
Committee. the Council may either take definitive 
action  on  or  may  establish  a  joint  approach. 
possibly including various options. to the propo- · 
sal  under discussion ; 
(c)  this joint approach shall  be submitted to the 
Conciliation Committee ; 
(d)  the  European  Parliament  shall.  within  a 
maximum period of three months following  the 
second  meeting  of the  Conciliation  Committee. 
deliver  a  new  opinion  on  the  Commission 
proposal ; 
(e)  on  expiry of this period or as  soon as  it .has 
received  a  new  opinion  from  parliament.  the 
Council shall be entitled to act definitively. 
6.  During the course of the  conciliation  proce-
dure  the  Presidents  of  the  three  institutions 
concerned shall take all requisite steps to facilitate 
proceedings and to enable it to  fulfil  the purpose 
specified in paragraph 3. They may. in particular. 
convene additional  meetings  of the Conciliation 
Committee. 
7.  This joint declaration replaces the joint declar-
ation of 4 March 1975 . 
Done at Brussels, ......... . 
I  OJ c 89. 22.4.1975. 
For the  Europe~n Parliament ·· 
For the Council 
For the Commission · 
. 15 The ·role  of  the  European  Parliament  in  the .preparation  and  conclusion  of 
international agreements and  accession treaties 
(Commission communication of 13  May  1982 to Parliament and the Council) 
:·  .. 
1~-t? 32.  For  a  considerable  time.  the  European 
Parliament has been  demanding a greater say  in 
the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of international 
agreements to  which the Community is  to be  a 
party  and  of treaties  on  the  accession .  of new 
Member  States.  These  demands.  which  carry 
added  weight  now  that  Parliament  is  directly 
elec~ed. were most recently and most comprehen-
sively  spelt  out  in  the  Blumenfeld  resolution 
adopted on  18  February 1  9 8  2. 1 
The Commission has always considered increased 
involvement  of Parliament  in  these  procedures 
both desirable and feasible  without upsetting the 
division  of powers between the  institutions  laid 
down in  the Treaties. 
Within the bounds of its own responsibilities, the 
Commission in fact already works in close .liaison 
with Parliament and maintains a constant inter-
change of information with it. 
However,  the  Commission  has  recently  under-
taken, in its communication of 14  October  19 81 
entitled 'Relations between the institutions of the 
Community':2 'to collaborate with Parliament and 
the Council  in  the  search  for  an  agreement  on 
practical improvements to existing procedures so 
that  Parliament  can  be  more  closely  involved 
in  the  preparation  of international  agreements, 
without eroding  the competences of the  indivi-
dual institutions·. 
The following  ideas and suggestions are submit-
ted to Parliament and the Council with the aim of 
fulfilling that undertaking. 
Allowing Parliament a greater say 
in the preparation and conclusion 
of international agreements 
Present situation - Differences from 
role of national parliaments 
33.  Under the Treaties, Parliament is consulted 
on agreements in cases where consultation of it is 
required by the article with forms the legal basis 
for the agreement. The Commission proposes that 
negotiations  be  held  and  conducts  the  negotia-
tions.  The  Council  authorizes  the  opening  of 
18 
negotiations.  gives  the Commission  any instruc-
tions which might be required, and concludes the 
agreement. 
In  February  1964  and  November  1973  the 
Council  adopted  two  procedures  known  as  the 
'Luns~ and 'Westerterp' procedure for association 
and  trade  a~reements respectively.  Their  main 
purpose is to ensure that.Parliament is kept fully 
informed  throughout  the  negotiation  of such 
agreements. 
The  role  of  the  European  Parliament  in  the 
system  set  up  by  the  Treaties  is  thu~ different 
from  that  played  by  national  parliaments  in 
.Member  States.  The  national  parliaments,  al-
though  unable to amend agreements  negotiated 
and signed by their governments, have the power, 
in important cases at least, to approve or reject the 
agreement  in  toto.  Under  some  constitutions, 
however,  certain types  of  agreement  escape 
parliamentary  scrutiny,  such  as  those  of  an 
administrative or technical  nature, those conclu-
ded  under  existing  legislation  or for  a  limited 
period,  .  and  those  with  only  minor  financial 
implications.  · 
~easures proposed 
Objective 
34.  •  The  objective  of the  suggestions  'the 
Commission has to  make cannot be to introduce 
into the Community legal  order a system similar 
to  those  in  force  in  the  Member  States.  That 
would  require amendment of the Treaties.  It is 
desirable, however, as Parliament recognizes, that 
a practice should be  adopted that is  as  close  as 
possible to those systems. 
•  The Commission  believes  that to attain  this 
objective it  is  necessary to increase Parliament's 
say in  the preparation and conClusion  of treaties · 
and agreements  that  are of significance  for  the 
formulation and application of Community poli-
cies. 
It is in. relation to instruments of  this type that the 
proposed  ~easures are intended to apply. 
It is not proposed that Parliament should have to 
consider  agreements  or  arrangements  of  an 
administrative  or technical  nature or which  are 
1  OJ C 66,  15.3.1982; Bull.  EC 2-1982. point 2.4.4. 
2  Page  12  of this Supplement. 
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ments. 
•  Adoption of the above objective also  means 
that, although Parliament would certainly not be 
left out of  the negotiation stage Gt would in fact be 
kept regularly informed throughout), its involve-
ment  would  be  greatest  at  the  stage  of  the 
conclusion of the agreement. 
It  appears  from  the  Blumenfeld  resolution  that 
Parliament agrees with this approach. 
Preparation and negotiation stage 
•  The Commission is prepared to inform Parlia-
ment (for  reasons of confidentiality, through the 
appropriate parliamentary committees) of projec-
ted  negotiations as early as  the stage of prepara-
tion of a draft negotiating brief for submission to 
the Council. The information given would cover 
the  main  points  of the negotiations.  Parliament 
would  thus  be  informed  of  the  ba~is  of the 
nego~iations before they were actually opened. 
•  The  Luns/Westerterp procedures  should  be 
extended to all treaties and agreements which the 
Community proposes to conclude and which are 
important for  the  formulation  or application  of 
Community policies. 
This  would  mean  that,  in  addition  to  the 
information  provided  by the  Commission  on  a 
routine basis through the parliamentary commit-
tees and the attendance of Council representatives 
at  any  debates  Parliament  might  hold,  the 
appropriate committees of Parliament would also 
be  acquainted by the Council, on a  confidential 
and  unofficial  basis,  of the substance  of agree-
me'nts before they are signed.1 This would apply 
not only to agreements based on Articles 238 and 
113  but also to those based on other articles. 
In this way Parliament would keep in close touch 
- much  closer  than  is  possible  for  national 
parliaments  - with  the  progress  of important 
international  agreements  at  all  stages  in  their 
preparation. 
By  judicious use  of the  information  it  received, 
Parliament would be  able to exert an  increased 
influence on the direction of the negotiations. 
Conclusion stage 
As  regards  Parliament's  involvement  in  the 
conclusion of agreements, the Commission consi-
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ders  that  the  following  two practical  measures 
would, without altering the existing legal  frame: 
work, allow Parliament to play a greater role. 
•  First, the Council would, except in  emergen-
cies,  consult  Parliament  after  signing  an  agree-
ment  not  only,  as  at  present,  in  cases  where 
consultation is. required by the Treaties, but also 
even where it is not bound to do so, in relation to 
all  treaties and agreements of importance for  the· 
formulation  and application ofCommunity poli-
cies. 
This  extension  of  consultation  of  Parliament 
would  chiefly  concern · important  agreements 
concluded  under  Article  113  (with  Article  238, 
which provides for  mandator'y consultation, the 
most frequent legal  basis  for  agreements),  but it 
would also cover important agreements based on 
other articles of  the Treaties which do not provide 
for consultation of Parliament. · 
It would, of course, be  necessary  for  Parliament 
to  deliver  its  opinion  within  the  time-liinit 
dictated by the urgency of the case. 
•  Secondly,  it  would  be  agreed  that  if Parlia-
ment  voted  by'  a  large  majority  against  the 
conclusion  of an  agreement  on  which  it  was 
consulted,  there  would  be  a  political  debate 
between  the three institutions concerned before 
the agreement was concluded. 
The  Commission  firmly  believes  that  through 
such a debate,  conducted in  an  open  and  frank 
atmosphere  at  an  appropriate . political  level. 
Parliament  would  be  able  tp  exert  a  definite  · 
influence on the decision  concerning the treaties 
and  agreements  which  were  important  for  the 
formulation and application of Community poli-
cies. 
Accession  treaties 
1.  Unlike agreements concluded by the Commu-
nity, treaties of accession to the EEC or Euratom 
are  negotiated  and  concluded  by  the  Member · 
States and not by the Community institutions.2  · 
1  The formal n'otiiication of Parliament after signing, which is 
provided  for  in  respect  of  trade  agreemen~  under  the 
Westerterp procedure, would become unnecessary if consulta-
tion  of Parliament  became  the  rule,  as  is  suggested.  The 
notification would be replaced by consultation.  . 
2  In the case of the ECSC, terms of accession are determined 
by the Council, acting unanimously. 
19 The Community institutions  have  a say  only in 
that the decision on the principle of accession is 
taken  by • the  Council,  after  consulting  the 
Commission. 
It is true, however, that the negotiations are held 
under .Council auspices and that the Commission 
is  involved in  them and in practice does a large 
part of the preparatory work. 
2.  This being so,  the involvement of Parliament 
in  accession  procedures  in  really  possible  only 
where the Community itself plays a role in such 
procedures, and within the limits imposed on that 
role. 
It is  suggested,  therefore,  that  before  taking  a 
decision  on  the  principle  of an  accession  the 
Council, as  well  as obtaining the opinion of the 
Commission,  should  also  encourage  a  political 
debate in Parliament. 
3.  Secondly, the Commission is prepared to keep 
Parliament informed of the progress of negotia-
20 
tions  in  so  far  as  it  is  free  to  disclose  such  · 
information. 
4.  Finally,  of course,  there  is  no  reason  why 
Parliament should not bring influence to bear on 
the. various  national  governmentS  and  parlia-
ments by drawing their attention to the results of 
the  debates  ·. it  holds  before·  the  opening  of 
negotiations and after the signing of an accession 
treaty. 
The suggestions outlined above represent,  in. the 
Commission's opinion, the rudiments of a prag-
matic  and  effective  procedure  which  would 
increase Parliament's say to the greatest possible 
extent.  in . the  interests  of  wider  democratic 
control, without upsetting the division of powers 
between the institutions laid down in the Treaties. 
When these suggestions have been considered by 
Parliament  and . the  Council,  detailed  arrange-
ments  could,  if  necessary,  be  worked  out  for  . 
implementing the procedure. 
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